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COPYRIGHT PROTECTION FOR
COMPUTER SOFTWARE IN NEW
ZEALAND
Brendan Cash'
Computer technology - whether it is hardware, so#ware or the internet - is the headache that
just won't go away for anyone grappling with the law of intellectual property. With the
Copyright Act 1994 the New Zealand legislature attempted to meet some of the challenges
but it largely avoided the issue, passing the headache on to the judiciary should any tricky
issues arise. One such issue is copyright protection for computer programs. The Copyright
Act 1994 makes it clear that computer progmms are protected as a literary work but how far
does that protection extend (or how far do we carry the fiction that a computer program is a
literary work)? This article attempts to second guess what level of protection our courts
might provide, drawing on decisions from the United Sates, the Commonwealth and New
Zealand. It argues that New Zealand has shown a willingness to protect .Ainctional items and
would protect the "look and feel" of a program, providing a level of protection which courts iii
the United States have considered undesirable.
I INTRODUCTION
Would New Zealand's copyright law protect Lotus' 1-2-3 1™nu command hierarchy?1
That the source code of Lotus 1-2-3 would receive copyright protection as a "literary"
work was rnade clear in IBM v Computer Imports Ltd.2 Moreover, the point received
statutory confirmation in section 2(1) of the Copyright Act 1994, which includes computer
* This paper was submitted as part of the LLB(Hons) programme and was awarded the 1995
Lowman-Friedlander prize by the New Zealand Institute of Patent Attorneys.
1 See Lotus Development Corp v Borland International Inc 49 F 3d 807 (lst Cir 1995) ("Borland").
2 [1989] 2 NZLR 395.
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programs as a form of"literary works". However, the Act fails to settle whether such "non-
literal" elements as Lotus' mau command hierarchy should be protected. Therefore, the
scope of copyright protection under the new Act has been left to the courts.
Should New Zealand's courts extend protection to a program's non-literal elements?3
This question raises two issues. The first is primarily legal and looks to established
copyright principles to establish what level of protection to provide. The second issue is
more policy-orientated and is concerned with what level of copyright protection is
necessary in order to promote the development of the software industry.4
This article focuses on the legal issue raised by the copyrightability of a computer
program's non-literal elements. In the absence of any guidelines from the New Zealand
legislature the courts should look to well established principles of copyright in order to
establish which aspects of a computer program should be copyrightable. The article will
examine the approaches developed in the United States and in the Commonwealth and will
look at their applicability in New Zealand.
This article will suggest that, while the scope of protection has been declining in the
United States, New Zealand's willingness to afford protection to "functional items" and to
the ideas they embody indicates that our courts may provide extensive protection to a
computer program's non-literal elements.
In essence this article argues that our law is similar to that expressed in the American
cases of Whelan Associates v Jaslow Dental Laboratory In2 and Lotus Development Corp v
Paperback Software International: These two cases are generally seen as the high point of
copyright protection for computer software since they provided protection to the "look and
feel" of a program. A similar approach to copyright protection has been confirmed by our
own Court of Appeal.7
This article will not directly address the policy issues raised by the copyrightability of
computer programs. The policy issues in this area are complex and cannot be answered on
a purely theoretical level. On the one hand computer programs may need a great deal of
protection because of the ease with which they may be copied. On the other hand existing
3 No case involving non-literal copying of a computer program has yet been dealt with by New
Zealand courts.
4 M Morgan "Trash Talking: The Protection of Intellectual Property Rights in Computer
Software" (1994) 26 Ottawa LR 425,430.
5 797 F 2d 1222 ed Cir 1986) ("Whelan").
6 740 F Supp 37 (D Mass 1990) ("Paperback").
7 Bleiman v News Media (Auckland) Ltd [1994] 2 NZLR 673 ("Bleiman").
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financial incentives may be enough to stimulate innovation, thereby reducing the need for
protection.8
However, this article acknowledges that there are important policy issues to be
addressed. The application of copyright law to computer software raises fundamental
policy issues which need to be addressed by the legislature. Further study must be
conducted into such matters as the relationship between copyright protection and software
innovation, the needs of software developers and the interests of consumers.' This is just
one of the myriad of issues that our legislature will need to address in the information age.
This article is divided into five main parts. Part I will give a brief outline of the nature
of computer programs and the programming process. Part II will examine the decisions on
this point in the United States and the tests which the courts have proposed. Part III will
look at the leading decisions in the Commonwealth; the decisions in Autodesk v Dayson,10
Ibcos Computers Ltd v Barclays Mercantile and DB Poolell and Delrina Corp v Toilet
Systems Inc.12 Part IV will outline the likely approach to the protection under New
Zealand law, while, finally, Part V will conclude the article, tying the various issues
together, and commenting on some of the policy issues raised by this subject.
II COMPUTER PROGRAMS
In order to understand the issues raised by the copyrightability of computer programs it
is necessary to have a basic understanding of computer programs. This section will
provide a brief guide to both the process of programming and the nature of programs
themselves.
Computer programs are essentially "sequences of instructions designed to manipulate a
computer in a particular way".13 In developing a program a programer goes through a
series of steps. Julian Velasco identifies five programing steps.14
8 See J Velasco "The Copyrightability of Non-literal Elements of Computer Programs" (1994) 94
Colum LR 242,283.
9 See MP Larvick "Questioning the Necessity of Copyright Protection for Software Interfaces"
[1994] 1 U Ill L Rev 187.
10 (1992) 104 ALR 563 ("Autodesk").
11 [1994] FSR 275 (Ibcos")·
12 (1993) 47 CPR (3d) 1 ("Delrina").
13 DWT Daniels "Learned Hand Never Played Nintendo: A Better Way to Think about the Non-
literal, Non-visual Software Copyright Cases" (1994) 61 U Chicago L Rev 613,615.
14 Above n 8,245-256.
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- Firstly, the programer identifies the task he or she wishes the software to perform.
For example the programr may wish to create an electronic spreadsheet.
- Secondly, the programer identifies the particular functions needed to meet the user's
demands. Using the example of the spreadsheet, the programer might want it to present
statistical results.
- Thirdly, the programer designs the overall structure of the program by breaking down
the functions into smaller and smaller subtasks or subroutines until the overall task is
broken down into manageable pieces.
- Fourthly, the programer must implement the design of the program by actually writing
the program's code. This is done first of all in a higher-level language such as "BASIC".
This is known as the source code. The source code is then translated into binary code
which the computer can read. This is known as object code.
- The final step in the process is "debugging'. This is the process in which errors are
identified and corrected. This is an ongoing process since errors may appear at any time
during a program's life.15
As we can see a program's written code (source or object) makes up only one part of a
program and programmng process.16 A key part of a program is its design or structure - "the
hierarchical division of tasks into subtasks, the interaction of one module with another,
and the way data passes from one part of the program to another".17 This is what we might
call the non-literal elements of a program.
However, the concept of a program's non-literal elements extends beyond its basic
structure. It includes its user interface - the mechanism through which the user operates a
program. The user interface is an important part of any program since it determines the
ease with which it can be used, which in turn helps to determine how successful a program
18
is. The menu command hierarchy on Lotus' 1-2-3 is a classic example of a successful user
interface.
Computer programers clearly have a vested interest in protecting more than just a
program's source or object - ie its literal elements. A key part of a program, and a large part
of the programing process, is the design or structure of a program and the way it interacts
with the user. Programers can, and do, copy the user interface or structure of successful
15 See n 13, 615-617, for further discussion on the nature of computer software.
16 Above n 8,247.
17 Above n 13, 617.
18 Above n 8,247.
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programs without actually copying the literal code.19 However, while an important part of
prograrns, should the non-literal elements of a program be protected?
II THE PROTECTION OF NON-LITERAL ELEMENTS IN THE UNITED
STATES
The relevant decisions in the United States have dealt with two questions. The first is
whether the non-literal elements of computer programs can be protected by copyright at all.
This is the broad question of copyrightability.20 The second question is in regards to what
test you adopt, having decided that the non-literal elements can be protected, for
copyrightability and substantial similarity in individual cases. This is the narrow
question of copyrightability.21 This section will examine the different decisions reached in
the United States in regards to both these issues.
A The Broad Question of Copyrightability
In the decision Whelan Associates Inc v Jaslow Dental Laboratoryn the Third Circuit
held that the non-literal elements of a computer program could be protected. This decision
on the broad question of copyrightability has been followed in a number of cases.
However, with the more recent decision in Lotus Development Corp v Borland International
Inc23 the copyrightability of a program's non-literal elements has been thrown into doubt,
especially the copyrightability of user interfaces.
Whelan was the first case to tackle the broad question of copyrightability. Whelan
was a case which involved a custom designed record-keeping program for dental
laboratories, the non-literal elements of which had allegedly been copied.
The primary issue was whether the "structure (or sequence and organisation) of a
program',24 could receive copyright protection. The Court of Appeal held that since:25
The copyrights of other literary works can be infringed even when there is no substantial
similarity between the works, it would thus appear that the copyrights of computer
programs can be infringed even absent copying of the literal elements of the program.
19 Above n 8,248.
20 TP Nicolas "GUI Wars" (1994) 47 Ark L Rev 139, 141.
21 Above n 20.
22 Above n 5.
23 Aboven 1.
24 Above n 5, 1224.
25 Above n 5, 1234.
396 (1997) 27 VUWLR
Whelan's decision to extend protection beyond a computer program's literal elements
was criticised. Some commentators argued that a program's structure is more akin to its
idea than its expression, and therefore should not be protected.26 However, the decision to
protect a program's non-literal elements was generally seen as uncontroversial and has
found widespread support.
In Johnson Contracts Inc v Phoenix Contract Systems Inc,27 the Ninth Circuit asserted:28
Whether the non-literal components of a program, including the structure, sequence and
organisation and user interface, are protected depends on whether, on the particular facts of
each case, the component in question qualifies as an expression of an idea, or an idea itself.
Lotus Development Corp v Paperback Software International" also confirmed the
decision in Whelan on the broad question of copyrightability. Paperback involved the
copying of the nienu oommand hierarchy in Lotus' spreadsheet program 1-2-3. Therefore,
unlike the court in Whelan, which was concerned only with the copying of a program's
structure, sequence and organisation, Paperback was concerned with the copyrightability
of a user interface.
The key issue in Paperback was whether Lotus' user interface, a key non-literal element
of the program, could be protected by copyright. The Massachusetts District Court
adopting the reasoning in Whelan, said that the user interface, as a non-literal element of a
program, could be protected. The court noted "that this type of copying of non-literal
expression, if sufficiently extensive, has never been upheld as permissible copying; rather,
it has always been viewed as copying of elements of an expression of creative
originality".30
Computer Associates International Ltd v Altai Inc,31 the definitive case in this area of
copyright law, appeared to lay the matter to rest. Judge Walker characterised Altai as
26 See above n 8,262; PS Menell "An Analysis of the Scope of Copyright Protection for Application
Programs" (1989) Stan Law R 1045; SR England "Note, Idea, Process or Protected Expression?"
(1990) Mich L R 866; KR Moon "Review of Legal Protection Computer and Semi Conductor
Technologies" in Ministry of Commerce "Review of Industrial Property Rights Patents, Trade
Marks and Designs" (Wellington).
17
866 F 2d 1173 (9th Cir 1989).
28 Above n 27, 1175.
29 Above n 6.
30 Above n 6,51.
31 982 F 2d 693 (2d Cir 1992). The defendant had hired an employee of the plaintiff to adapt the
defendants scheduling program to a different IBM operating system. The employee did so,
making use of the plaintiffs copyrighted ADAFTER source code. After suit was filed, the
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dealing with the "challenging question of whether and to what extent the non-literal
aspects of a computer program, that is, those aspects not reduced to a written code, are
i, 32
protected by copyright .
Following Whelan, the court in Altai acknowledged the powerful analogy that if the
non-literal structures of literary works are protected by copyright; and if computer
programs are literary works, as provided for by the legislature; then the non-literal
structures of computer programs are protected by copyright.
However, while endorsing Whelan 's approach to the broad question of
copyrightability the court in Altai criticised the test formulated in Whelan to decide the
narrow issue of copyrightability. In this regard the decision in Altai is markedly different
from that in either Whelan or Paperback. Altai represents the first of a number of cases
which reduced the level of copyright protection for computer software as a result of the
test adopted for the narrow issue of copyrightability.
The scope of protection has been further narrowed by the recent decision of the First
Circuit in Borland. Borland was an appeal from a District Court decision holding that
Borland had infringed Lotus' copyright in its spreadsheet program 1-2-3 when it copied the
menu command hierarchy into its spreadsheet programs Quattro and Quattro Pro. Borland
is therefore another case dealing with the copyrightability of user interfaces. The question
on appeal was whether Lotus' menu command hierarchy was copyrightable.33
The court's answer was that a menu command hierarchy was excluded from copyright
protection since it was a method of operation.34 It compared the Inenu command hierarchy
of 1-2-3 to the buttons on a VCR. Like the buttons on a VCR the r™nu command hierarchy
was the means by which the program was operated.35 As such, regardless of how many
ways a menu command hierarchy might be expressed or how original it was, it could not be
protected.
This conclusion was driven by the consideration that a computer program is a
functional item. Circuit Judge Boudin expressed the point that as a literary work "the
defendant rewrote the copied portion of OSCAR, as the program was known. The issue was
whether there was still non-literal copying.
32 Above n 31, 696.
33 Above n 23,806. See also Lotus Development Corp v Borland 133 L Ed 2d 610, 116 Ct 804 (1996).
The court split equally on the matter and as a result the decision of the Circuit Court of
Appeals was affirmed.
34 Above n 23, 815.
35 Above n 23, 817.
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problem presented by computer programs is fundamentally different ... [t]he computer
program is a means for causing something to happen; it has a mechanical utility, an
instrumental role, in accomplishing the world's work.',36 While the court noted that
functionality did not act as a bar to copyright protection it did state that it altered the
calculation (against protection).37
Therefore, while Whelan, Paperback and Altai are key cases which have confirmed the
copyrightability of a computer program's non-literal elements, including a program's user
interface, the decision in Borland casts doubt over whether the user interface, a key non-
literal element of a program, can ever be protected by copyright. By its very nature the user
interface is the way in which a computer program is operated. Therefore, all user
interfaces would appear to be "methods of operation", and hence not able to be protected.
The protection available to computer programs has also been narrowed by the tests for
copyrightability and substantial similarity. These tests will now be examined.
B The Narrow Issue of Com/rightability
Whelan and Paperback represent the high point of copyright protection for computer
software. They protected the "look and feel" of a program However, since the decision in
Altai the courts have adopted a process of analytic dissection which has greatly reduced
the degree of protection.
In Whelan the court constructed the following test for distinguishing between
unprotected idea and protected expression. "[T]he purpose or function of a utilitarian
work would be the work's idea, and everything that is not necessary to that purpose or
function would be part of the expression of that idea.'08
Applying this test the court found that the purpose of the program in Whelan was to aid
in the operations of a dental laboratory and that the program's structure was not essential
to that purpose since similar software performed the same function with different
structures.39 As a result the structure of the program in Whelan was expression, rather
than idea.
Altai criticised the test in Whelan as being too simplistic since it assumed that only one
idea underlies any computer program. The reality is that programs are usually a complex
36 Above n 23, 819.
37 Above n 23, 819.
38 Above n 5, 1236.
39 Above n 5,1237.
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structure of sub-routines, each with its own idea.40 The test was also criticised a s
providing too much protection since whatever is not idea can be protected as expression.41
With its three part test for the narrow issue of copyrightability the decision in
Paperback was an advance on Whelan, particularly in its adoption of Judge Hands'
abstraction test. The test is as follows:42
FIRST, ... the decision maker must focus on alternatives ... along the scale from the most
generalised conception to the most particularised, and choose some formulation - some
conception or definition of the idea - for the purpose of distinguishing between the idea and
its expression ...
SECOND, the decision maker must focus upon whether an alleged expression of the idea is
limited to elements essential to expression of that idea ... or instead includes identifiable
elements of expression not essential to every expression of that idea.
THIRD, having identified elements of expression not essential to every expression of the
idea, the decision maker must focus on whether these elements are a substantial part of the
allegedly copyrightable work.
By adopting this test the decision in Paperback recognised that more than one idea could
underlie a computer program.
However, while an advance on Whelan, the test in Paperback is not fundamentally
different.43 The abstractions test would not look out of place in Whelan since the it simply
seeks to distinguish between idea and expression. It was this distinction which formed the
foundation of the test in Whelan.44 Moreover, in applying its three part test the court in
Paperback refused to dissect the allegedly infringed program and instead dealt with it as a
whole. While holding that the "look and feel" concept was not significantly helpful,5 the
court did state that:
46
to determine copyrightability, a court need not - and indeed should not - dissect every
element of the allegedly infringing work. Rather, the court need only identify those elements
40 Above n 32,703.
41 Above n 8, 261.
42 Above n 6, 60-61.
" Above n 20, 146; above n 8, 275.
44 Above n 8,275-276.
45 Above n 6,62-63.
46 Above n 6,67.
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that are copyrightable, and then determine whether those elements, considered as a whole,
have been impermissibly copied.
Indeed, when applying the second part of its test to the facts the court concluded that
the menu structure:47
taken as a whole - including the choice of command terms, the structure and order of those
terms, their presentation on the screen, and the long prompts - is an aspect of 1-2-3 that b
not present in every expression of an electronic spreadsheet.
A similar approach can be found in Whelan. As David Daniels observes, the rule in
Whelan also establishes a guide to the what structural elements a judge should compare for
copyright purposes.48 The guide indicates that a judge may compare structure at any level
of abstraction, however high - ie the work as a whole. The court in Whelan states that it is
"concerned with overall similarities between the programs".w
By examining the programs as a whole, the tests in Whelan and Paperback favour the
finding of copyright protection. As a result both decisions are seen as the high-point of
copyright protection for computer programs.50 With the decision in Altai there was a shift
towards analytical dissection with a corresponding decline in the protection for computer
software.
The abstractions test, which forms a part of the test in Paperback, also forms the basis
of the abstraction-filtration-comparison test adopted in Altai. However, the test is
fundamentally different from that in Paperback as it undertakes the process of dissection
which the court in Paperback expressly rejected.
The test in Altai directs that a trial court should:51
(1) break down the allegedly infringed program into its constituent structural parts' and
then
(2) 'sift out all non-protectable material' so as to
47 Above n 6.
48 Above n 13, 629.
49 Above n 5,1246.
50
Above n 20, 145.
51 See JE Brown "'Analytical Dissection' of Copyrighted Computer Software - Complicating the
Simple and Confounding the Complex" (1995) 11 Computer Law and Practice 16, 19; Brown
was counsel for Apple in its litigation against Microsoft and he acknowledges his bias against
the process of analytic dissection which occurs in Altai and which was adopted, to the
disadvantage of Apple, in its litigation against Microsoft.
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(3) confine comparison and protection to the 'kernel, or possibl[y] kernels, of creative
expression [left] after following this process of elimination'.
Under the rigours of this test the court in Altai found that only a few elements of the
allegedly infringed program - a few parameter lists and macros - could withstand scrutiny
and be protected by copyright.52 Since these were only minor elements of the program the
court held that a finding of infringement could not be maintained.53
The decision in Altai has received a mixed response. One commentator praised Altai as
"a significant advance in establishing, for software copyright cases, a method for
determining infringement that is both consistent with traditional copyright law and
workable".54 The approach of the Second Circuit in Altai has been applied by the Ninth
Circuit in Sega Enterprises Ltd v Accolaide Inc,55 by the Federal Circuit in Atari Games
Corp v Nintendo of America56 and by the Tenth Circuit in Gales Publisher Co u Bando Chem
Industries Ltd.57
The test in Altai has also received approval in the most recent Court of Appeal decision
on this issue. In Borland the First Circuit's Court of Appeal held that, while they did not
find Altai helpful in deciding whether the "literal copying of a nlenu command hierarchy
constitutes copyright infringement", the "Altai test may provide a useful framework for
i, 58
assessing the alleged non-literal copying of computer code .
Critics of Altai have, however, identified the case as a "legal Chernobyl"59 due to the
drastic reduction in protection it provides for a computer program's non-literal elements.
Critics argue that by "dissecting" a program and removing individually unprotected items
before comparing it to the allegedly infringing work the court may in fact miss or eliminate
52 Above n 32, 714.
53 Above n 32, 715.
54 D Bender "Computer Associates v Altai: Rationality Prevails" [1992] The Computer Lawyer 1, 1.
55 24 USPQ 1561 (9th Cir. 1992); Ninth Circuit approved and applied Altai when considering the
degree of protection which could be accorded to video games under the 'fair use' doctrine.
56 975 F 2d 832 (Fed Cir 1992); Approving and applying the test in Altai the Federal Circuit held
that Atari had copied the security system in Nintendo's entertainment system.
57 9 F 3d 823 (10th Cir 1993); Tenth Circuit endorsed Altai's test as a way of determining whether
menus and sorting criteria are copyrightable.
58 Above n 1, 814.
59 AL Clapes &JM els "Revenge of the Luddites: A Closer Look at Cimputer Associates v Altai"
[1992] The Computer Lawyer 11, 11.
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protectable elements, such as the way in which various elements are organised or
combined.60
The narrowing of protection in Altai seems to arise out of the court's scepticism about
the appropriateness of using copyright law to protect computer programs. The court
adopts the abstraction-filtration-comparison test as a result of its characterisation of
computer programs as being "highly functional utilitarian" items which can have "only one
or two forms of expression", making them unworthy of copyright protection.61
The decision in Altai thus illustrates a marked shift away from the judicial attitudes
illustrated in Whelan and Paperback. While in Paperback the court held "that elements of
expression, even if embodied in useful articles, are copyrightable",2 the court in Altai
clearly doubts that a useful article such as a computer program can have any
"copyrightable" expression.
A similar attitude permeates the trial court decision of Apple Computer Inc u Microsoft
Corp,63 a decision which was upheld by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal.64 The court
engaged in a form of "analytic dissection" based on a conception of a computer similar to
that in Altai.65 The court believed that computer interfaces "serve a purely functional
purpose in the same way that the visual displays and user commands of the dashboard,
steering wheel, gear shift, brakes, dutch and accelerator serve as the user interface of an
automobile.1,66
The court dissected Macintosh's user interface into its smallest elements and viewed
each element in isolation. "Not surprisingly", Apple's counsel Jack E Brown noted, "[the
court] concluded that almost every element was unprotectable as unoriginal, not an artistic
expression or otherwise not protectable.',67
60 A M Fitzgerald "Square Pegs and Round Holes" (1993) 4 J Law and Information Science 142,
147.
61 Above n 52, 19.
62 Above n 6,54.
63 799 F Supp 1006 (ND Cal 1992). Apple sued Microsoft to protect the audio-visual works that
constituted the graphical user interface on screens of Apple's Macintosh computers. A key
issue in the case was to what extent Apple had licensed the use of its user interface to
Microsoft. As a result a process of analytic dissection was inevitable.
64 Apple Computer v Microsoft Corp 35 F 2D 1435 (9th Cir 1994).
65 Above n 51, 20.
66 Above n 63, 1023.
67 Above n 52, 21.
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In Microsoft the court also dealt a blow to the concept of "look and feel" - of protecting
a program as a whole, as the courts did in Whelan and Paperback. The court expressly
stated that:68
Without dispute, a copier may not make immaterial variations and thereby escape copyright
liability ... and to this limited extent, there is some legitimacy for a 'look and feel test" ... but
this test should be applied only after protectable expression has been identified, not before, as
Apple would have this court do.
The process of "analytic dissection" undertaken in Microsoft drew upon the Ninth
Circuit's decision in Brown Bag Software v Symantec Corporation.69 Brown Bag accepted
the copyrightability of a program's non-literal elements and proposed a test which, while
not identical to that in Altai, is compatible with it.70
Brown Bag set up a bifurcated test for "substantial similarity". The first part of the test
is an extrinsic test which involves an objective analysis of expression.71 In this phase the
program is analytically dissected and unprotectable elements of expression are eliminated
in order to define the scope of copyright protection.72 The second phase of the test is the
intrinsic test. It is only triggered when the court finds objective similarity in protected
expression. This phase measures substantial similarity depending on the response of the
ordinary person.73
The approach adopted in Brown Bag, and followed in Microsoft, is not fundamentally
different from the test in Altai. All three tests dissect a program, remove the unprotectable
elements, and then compare the "kernels" of original expression. Moreover, all the tests
significantly reduce the protection available to computer software and arise as a result of
the view that computers are functional items that do not merit protection.
In stark contrast, the earlier decisions in Whelan and Paperback extended protection to
the "look and feel" of a computer program, providing extensive copyright protection to a
68 Above n 63, 1026.
69 960 F 2d 1465 (9th Cir 1992). An independent programmer developed an out-lining program
which was sold to Brown Bag Software. The programmer then developed a competing
product which was sold to Symantec. Brown Bag sued alleging copyright infringement.
Accepting the copyrightability of a program's non-literal elements, the key issue was whether
copyright in the programs non-literal elements had been infringed.
70 Above n 8,279.
71 Above n 8,267.
72 Above n 8,267.
73 Above n 8,267-268.
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computer program's structure, sequence, organisation and user interface. These decisions
were driven by the view that computer programs, regardless of their functional nature, did
deserve protection where protectable expression could be separated from unprotectable
idea.
C Conclusion
With the decisions in Whelan and Paperback, the courts accepted that a program's non-
literal elements - its structure through to its user interface; could be protected. These cases
then adopted tests that provided protection to the "look and feel" of a program, expressly
rejecting the process of analytical dissection.
However, while the courts in Altai, Brown Bag and Microsoft all accepted the
copyrightability of a program's non-literal elements, including the user interface, they
developed tests for the narrow issue of copyrightability which greatly reduced the level of
protection. This shift in the level of protection arose largely out of the court's view that
computer programs are utilitarian items which merit only minimal protection.
Finally, with the Court of Appeal decision in Borland, the functional view of computers
has led effectively to the denial of protection to a computer's user interface. In answering
the broad question of copyrightability (in regards to user interfaces) the court in Borland,
in stark contrast to the court in Paperback, denied protection.
III THE PROTECTION OF NON-LITERAL ELEMENTS IN THE
COMMONWEALTH
In trying to establish whether and to what extent New Zealand should protect the non-
literal elements of computer pregrams, some assistance may be derived from three decisions
on this issue within the Commonwealth - the Australian Iligh Court decision in Autodesk
Inv v Dayson,74 the English High Court decision in Ibcos Computers Ltd v Barclays
Mercantile and DB Poole5 and the decision of the Ontario General Division in Delrina Inc
u Triolet Systems In¢36
A Autodesk Inc v Dayson
Autodesk involved the corriputer program AutoCAD and its accompanying hardware
device called an "AutoCAD lock", a device without which the program could not operate.77
74 Above n 10.
75 Above n 11.
76 Above n 12.
77 Above n 10, 563.
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The defendant, after examining the lock, produced his own version.78 This lock
incorporated a 127-bit look up table which comprised a substantial part of Widget C, a
program within AutoCAD, that operated in conjunction with the lock. The owners of the
copyright in AutoCAD sued alleging that the defendant had infringed their copyright in
AutoCAD.
The High Court of Australia held the production by the defendant of his lock
constituted an infringement of the copyright which the plaintiffs held in the AutoCAD
program.79 This was because a substantial part of Widget C was its 127-bit look up table
and its reproduction in the defendant's lock was a reproduction of a substantial part of
AutoCAD which was literary work in respect of which the copyright was vested in the
plaintiffs.80
Given that the source and object code of Widget C had not been copied, but only the
program's 127-bit look up table, it would appear that the court in Autodesk was extending
protection to a program's non-literal elements, although this is not crystal clear. The court
did hold, however that:81
The definition of 'computer program' in s10(1) of the Act should not be understood as
referring only to an actual written expression or representation of a set of instructions but it
should be understood as conferring protection upon a set of instructions itself.
As a result, even though the defendant's lock had not copied the source code of the
Widget C program, it had copied its 127-bit table and it therefore infringed the copyright
the plaintiff held in its AutoCAD program. It would therefore appear that the High Court
in Autodesk effectively extended copyright protection in Australia to include a program's
non-literal elements.
B Ibcos Computers Ltd v Barclays Mercantile and DB Poole
In Ibcos the English High Court considered the substance and extent of the protection
copyright provides for a computer program. Although Ibcos dealt primarily with the
copying of source code it nonetheless commented on whether a program's non-literal
elements would be protected. The court also considered the value of the test for substantial
similarity developed in Altai.
78 Above n 10, 565-570.
79 Above n 10,575.
80 Above n 10,573-74
81 Above n 10, 564.
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The court in Ibcos dealt with statements from John Richardson Computers v Flanders
Chemtec Ltd which approved the test in Altai. In John Richardson the court stated:82
There is nothing in an English case which conflicts with the general approach adopted in
the Computer Associates case ... at the stage at which the question of substantial similarity of
any copying falls to be assessed ... the question which has to be asked ... is essentially the same
question ... address[ed] in Comptiter Associates.
However, the court in Ibcos rejected the approach in Altai as generally unhelpful. The
search for a core of protectable expression had no place in English law. In England the
court would "first decide whether the plaintiff's program as a whole is entitled to
copyright protection".83 Moreover, in Ibcos the court noted that English copyright law
draws no distinction between aesthetic and functional works. The courts are prepared to
protect the "detailed" (as opposed to the "general") ideas of any work.84
The court in Ibcos did, however, agree with the decision in John Richardson that the
consideration of copyright infringement is not restricted to the text of the code. The court
stated:85
Most literary copyright works involve both literal matter (the exact words of a novel or
computer program) and varying levels of abstraction (plot, more or less detailed of a novel,
general structure of a computer program). I therefore think it right to have regard in this
case not only to what Mr Turner called the 'literal similarities' but also to what he called
'program structure' and design eatures.
In its examination of the ])rogram involved, the court concluded that, while the
compilation of programs should receive copyright protection, other features of the program
did not since they were at a level of generality that did not attract protection.86
C Delrina Inc v Triolet Systems Inc
Delrina involved a former employee who, while employed by the plaintiff, had
developed a performance monitoring program. After leaving the plaintiffs employment, the
employee developed a competinE; product which was marketed by the defendant.87 Delrina
82 Above n 11, 302.
83 Above n 11, 302.
84 Above n 11, 292.
85 Above n 11, 302.
86 Above n 11, 304-305.
87 Above n 4,460.
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dealt mainly with the issue of literal copying, however, the court did declare that the non-
literal elements of a computer program could be protected. The court stated:88
I conclude that under US copyright law and based on statutory provisions equivalent to
those in the Canadian Copyright Act, copyright is extended to all parts of computer
programs ... The attitude of the US Copyright Office and that of the US courts in Computer
Associates and Lotus strengthen my conclusion that both the literal and non-literal portion of
the Sysview program could be protected by copyright under the Copyright Act.
In addition to extending protection to the non-literal elements of a computer program
Delrina adopted the test for copyrightability from Altai and Microsoft. The court stated:89
Whether a Canadian court should adopt the abstraction-filtration-comparison method in
deciding an action for copyright infringement or some other method, it seems clear that
before a computer program or some part of it can be held to be copyrightable, some method
must be found to weed out or remove from copyright protection those portions which, for
the various reasons already mentioned, cannot be protected by copyright. After the portions
that are not copyrightable have been filtered out there may not be any kernels or golden
nuggets left to which copyright can attach.
Delrina's reliance on the analysis in Altai and Microsoft seems to arise out of its
acceptance of the American view that "even if the expression originated with the author,
the expression of the idea is not copyrightable if the expression does no more than embody
elements of the idea that are functional in the utilitarian sense.
1,90 This is a curious
position for a Canadian court to take since traditionally Canadian law, like English law,
has not drawn any distinction between functional and aesthetic items when dealing with
copyright issues.91
D Conclusion
These three Commonwealth decisions are clear authority for the proposition that
copyright protection can extend to a program's non-literal elements. However, the
decisions do not provide the same degree of protection. The Australian High Court
decision in Autodesk provides no clear guidelines as to what is, and what is not,
protectable. In Ibcos the English High Court rejected the test from Altai and instead
provided protection to a computer program "as a whole". In Delrina the Ontario General
88 Aboven 12,32
89 Above n 12,37.
90 Above n 12, 41.
91 Aboven 12,462.
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Division adopted wholeheartedly the analysis in Altai and Microsoft that computer
programs are functional items which contain only a core of protectable expression.
IV THE PROTECTION OF NON-LITERAL ELEMENTS IN NEW
ZEALAND
The protection of non-literal elements in New Zealand involves the same questions that
have arisen in the United States. Firstly should copyright protection to non-literal
elements be extended at all. This identified as the broad question of copyrightability. It is
accepted that the non-literal elements can be protected in New Zealand, the second
questions relates to what test o r approach should be adopted in respect of the narrow
issue of copyrightability and sut,stantial similarity in individual cases.
Both these questions shall be answered by reference to New Zealand case law in the
area of copyright. It will suggest that on the basis of the established copyright principles
in New Zealand or altemativelv extend copyright protection to a program's non-literal
elements should be extended. Furthermore, it will suggest that, on the basis of the current
approach to issues of copyrightability and substantial similarity, a very similar test to the
"look and feel" approach developed in the cases of Whelan and Paperback, will be adopted.
A The Broard Issue of Copyrightability in New Zealand
The leading decisions in the United States and in the Commonwealth have
overwhelmingly concluded that the non-literal elements of a computer program can be
protected by copyright law. Hcwever, as this article has noted, the decision in Borland
casts doubt over these decisions, especially the decision in Paperback to extend copyright
protection to the user interface. Should copyright protection be extended, or should it be
declared that the non-literal elements of a program cannot be protected.
The decisions in Autodesk. 1bcos and Delrina are persuasive authority, from courts
within the Commonwealth, that, as in the United States, New Zealand should extend
protection. All three decisions were made under copyright statutes substantially similar,
or almost identical to our own. Section 14(1)(a) and section 2(1) of the Copyright Act 1994
state that:92
14 Copyright in original works --
(1) Copyright is a property right that exists ... in original works of the following
descriptions:
(a) literary ... works
92 Copyright Act 1994, ss 2(1) and 14(1)(a).
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2. Interpretation -
(1) In this Act ... "literary work" means any work... that is written, spoken or sung; and
includes -
(a) A table or compilation, and
(b) A computer program.
Section 3(1) of The Copyright, Design and Patents Act (UK) 1988 in England contains a
definition of a literary work which is identical to our own. Moreover, in addition to New
Zealand Copyright Act, the English Act also fails to provide any definition of what a
computer program is.
The Australian Copyright Act 1968, as amended in 1984, is more comprehensive. It
includes a definition of a computer program in section 10(1) of the Act and, as this article
has observed, that definition played a key role in the decision in Autodesk:3 However, the
decision in Autodesk gave the definition in section 10(1) a broad meaning by extending
protection to a program's set of instructions.
In Delrina the defendants argued before the Canadian courts that the definition of a
computer program in their Act as a "set of instructions embodied or stored in any manner"
implied that only the literal instructions of a program could be protected.4 However, the
court in Delrina rejected that argument, holding that non-literal elements could be protected
under their Act.95
Since the Copyright Act 1994 does not burden the courts in New Zealand with the
definition of a computer program there is no impediment to New Zealand following the
decisions in Delrina or Autodesk. Moreover, the decision to extend protection in Ibcos was
made under a copyright statute identical to our own. Therefore, the nature of the
Copyright Act 1994 allows the courts in New Zealand to follow decisions in other
Commonwealth jurisdictions to extend protection beyond a program's literal elements.
The decision in cases like Whelan and Paperback, as well as in Autodesk, Ibcos and
Delrina, to extend protection also accords well with New Zealand's copyright case law.
A fundamental linchpin of the decisions in Whelan, Paperbad(, Altai and Ibcos to extend
protection was the powerful analogy that if computer programs are literary works, and if
the non-literal elements of other literary works are protected by copyright then the non-
93 Above n 82.
94 Above n 4,460.
95 Above n 91.
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literal elements of computer prc,grams must also be protected:6 This analogy would also
appear to hold true for New Zealand.
In Wilson v BCNT' Jefferies J held that a feasibility study for a television program
(outlining the original concept characters and storylines) was a dramatic work in a
material form protected by copyright.98 In reaching its conclusion, the court in Wilson
expressly rejected a defence al·gument that the feasibility study was not protected by
copyright as all it represented vias a mere idea:' The court then found that the defendant
had infringed the plaintiffs cooyright in the feasibility study by producing a television
show which took "[a]11 of the key components of the plaintiff's concept, or format... [of]
two puberty aged children using their stick and wheelchair as weapons to fight evil and do
good" too
Wilson gives a clear indication that the courts in New Zealand are prepared to protect
more than just the copying of a work's literal elements. The courts will protect a work's
concept format or key features. It should be noted that the decision in Wilson is tempered
by the decision of the Privy Council in Green v BCNZ101 which upheld the decision of our
Court of Appea1102 not to extencl protection to the format of a talent quest.
In the Court of Appeal Case'l J held:103
I have strong reservations whether such protection can be brought within the framework of
our Act to prevent piracy of the basic concept underlying a series of changing dramatic
works. It is difficult to see in what way the underlying idea has been distilled out and
translated into an expression in a material form.
However, the decision of both the Court of Appeal and the Privy Council was premised
largely on the fact that the format was only minimal in nature, involving nothing more than
the repetition of a few catch phrases in an everchanging show.104 In comparison Wilson
96 Above n 33.
97 [1990] 2 NZLR 565 ('Wilson").
98 Above n 97,572.
99
Above n 97,572.
100
Above n 97,572.
101
[1989] 3 NZLR 18 ("Green").
102
[1988] 2 NZLR 490.
103
Above n 102, 503.
104
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involved a detailed description of the characters and plots for each show. In that regard
Green seems to be merely an illustration of the point made in Ibcos that the courts will
105
protect a detailed idea, but not a general idea or concept.
The recognition that a copyright work rnay involve a series of abstractions, the most
general of which are not protected, is apparent in the High Court decision in Plix Products
Ltd v Frank M Winstone (Merchants) Ltd.
106 In Plix Products Prichard J drew the
distinction between the general idea or concept - which is not protected - and a second form
of idea which, when reduced to concrete form, may be the subject of copyright. Prichard J
observed that:
107
The author of a work will scarcely be able to transform the basic concept into a concrete form
... without furnishing it with details of form and shape. The novelist will think of characters,
dialogue, details of plot and so forth ... when these ideas (which are essentially constructive
in character) are reduced to concrete form, the forms they take are where copyright resides.
This view of copyrighted works as a series of abstractions, some which are protectable
and some which are not, is also apparent in the recent decision of the Court of Appeal in
Bleiman v News Media (Auckland) Ltd.108 In Bleiman Gault J stated that in drawing this
distinction between idea and expression:109
[i]t is all a matter of to what degree of particularity or generality the idea is taken. Clearly for
infringement of copyright in a dramatic work, a play, it is unnecessary for every and
movement to be precisely as in the original ... in the case of literary works inexact
reproduction frequently is held to infringe. Textual reproduction is not essential.
What is clear from these cases is that in New Zealand copyright protection extends
beyond literal expression. The courts have acknowledged that in any copyright work
there is a series of abstractions and that, while no copyright will reside in the general idea
of a work, copyright will reside in other ideas which a work expresses. This means that
105 Above n 86.
106 (1984) 3 IPR 390 hereafter referred to as Plix Products. Two marketing organisations laid down
requirements for Kiwi fruit packaging based on the plaintiffs' packaging. The defendant
produced packaging working off those guidelines. The issue was whether the defendants
packaging infringed the copyright which the plaintiffs held in their Kiwi fruit packaging
design.
107 Above n 106, 419.
108 Above n 7.
109 Above n 7,678.
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the powerful analogy used in Whelan, Paperback, Altai and Ibcos to extend copyright
protection applies in New Zealand.
New Zealand copyright la,N essentially uses the celebrated "abstractions" test first
penned by Judge Hand in Nich'ols u Universal Pictures Corp.11° Judge Hand noted that:
Upon any work... a great number of patterns of increasing generality will fit equally well, as
more and more of the incident is left out. The last may perhaps be no more than the most
general statement of what the [work] is about; ... but there is a point in this series of
abstractions where they are nc longer protected, since otherwise the [author] could prevent
the use of his "ideas", to which, apart from their expression, his property never extended.
This test is mentioned in most of the leading United Sates decisions which have
extended protection to a program's non-literal elements. It forms the foundation of the test
in Altai for copyrightability, which is the leading test in the United States.Ill Therefore, if
a computer program is a literary work protected by copyright, and if the non-literal
elements (abstractions, detailed ideas etc) of other copyrighted works are protected, it
would appear that there is a powerful argument that New Zealand should protect the non-
literal elements of computer programs.
An impediment which mighl be erected to deny the protection of a computer program's
non-literal elements in New Zealand is that a computer program can be distinguished from
a novel or play in that it is a functional item As described above, cases in the United
States, such as Altai and Mi crosoft, have used this argument to reduce the level of
protection.112 More recently it has formed part of the reasoning of the Court of Appeal
decision in Borland where the court effectively denied protection to user interfaces.113
However, this distinction between functional and aesthetic works was clearly rejected
in Ibcos. The court stated: 114
United States case law has, ever since Baker v Selden, been extremely careful to keep
copyright out of the functioiial field, either by saying there is no copyright in, or that
copyright cannot be infringed by taking, the functional. In Baker a design of ledger sheets
which had a particular function was refused copyright. I doubt that would have happened
here.
11{' 45 F 2d 119 (2d Cir 1930).
111 Above n 51.
112 Above n 62.
113 Above n 36.
114
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The same rule appears to apply in New Zealand. Here the category of artistic works
has been used to protect industrial designs and other functional and mechanistic items.
Baker J in Bendon Industries Ltd v Presslok Industries Ltd115 noted that "claims for breach
of copyright in this court have included such diverse objects as PVC kiwifruit trays, farm
goods, steel filing cabinets, frisbees and plastic tie straps".
The extent of copyright protection to such items was restricted in the Copyright
117
Amendment Act 1985116 and has more recently been cut back in the Copyright Act 1994.
However, the courts draw no distinction between functional and aesthetic works, expect
where Parliament has indicated that they should do so.
In PS Johnson Associates Ltd v Bucko Enterprises Ltd118 the court was confronted with
the argument that since copyright does not protect ideas, some utilitarian articles should
not receive copyright protection. The example used was that of the drawing of a ball
bearing. It was contended that its shape was idea and that if copyright protection was
extended to such a drawing the idea of a ball bearing would be protected.119 However, the
court rejected this argument. It contented that "possibly there was insufficient time, skill,
judgement and labour used in producing a drawing of so simple a character as a ball
bearing".120 In making this reply the court made it clear as long as a work is original it rnay
receive the protection of copyright.
In answering the question of whether copyright protection should extend to a computer
program's non-literal elements it is clear that, on the basis of established copyright
principles, it should.
In Ibcos, Autodesk and Delrina England, Australia and Canada have extended
protection under a copyright statute similar, if not identical, to the New Zealand
legislation.
115 (1982) TCLR 61, 70.
116 Section 20A and s 20B of the Copyright Amendment Act 1985 meant that the making of any
object in three dimensions would not infringe the copyright in an artistic or literary work if it
reproduced part of a patent specification or when the object of reproduction had been lawfully
applied industrially in New Zealand for more than sixteen years.
117 Section 2(1) of the Copyright Act 1994 states that there is no copyright in an artistic work
which is a layout design or an integrated circuit within the meaning of the Layout Designs Act
1994.
118 [1975] 1 NZLR 311.
119 Above n.118, 320-321.
120 Above n 118, 321.
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An examination of New Zealand case law reveals the willingness of the courts to
extend protection beyond a work's literal expression to some of the ideas it embodies. In
the United States, in cases such as Whelan and Altai, the courts have indicated that should
copyright protection be extende,i beyond the actual words of other literary works then the
same should be the case for computer programs.
Finally the functional nature of computer programs does not act as a legal reason for
denying or limiting the protection of computer software in New Zealand. Under our law
functional items, such as PVC ]<iwifruit trays, have been granted copyright protection.
Therefore, there appears to be no legal impediment to the extension of copyright protection
to a program's non-literal elemerits.
B 77,2 Narrow Question of Co,vyrightability in New Zealand
To which non-literal elements of a computer program will protection extend? This is
the narrow question of copyrightability. If a program's non-literal elements are to be
protected should the abstraction-filtration-comparison test from Altai, the leading test in
the United States be adopted, or should New Zealand adopt a test which resembles the
"look and feel" approach of earlj er cases?
The abstraction-filtration-comparison test developed in Altai has been approved in a
number of subsequent decisions and has been praised by commentators. 121 It is seen as the
test which best reflects the true iature of computer programs. Therefore, as the standard
test in the United States, the Altai test would appear to be a logical choice.
Further support for its adoption comes in the form of the recommendations made by the
Australian Copyright Law Review Committee (CLRC) in its draft report "Computer
Software Protection".122 The re ort mcommends that no amendment be made to secure the
protection of a program's "look and feel". Instead the CLRC supports the test in Altai
believing that the need for sta ndardisation and efficient user interfaces supports an
inherently underprotective appr,jach.123
However, regardless of its alleged merits, the approach in Altai does not appear to be
compatible with New Zealand's case law. Altai's version of Judge Hand's abstraction test
calls for a program to be dissected into its constituent parts and then the rest of the test
demands that the unprotectable elements be filtered out before the process of comparison
121 Above n 55.
122
P Walters "Copyright or Copy f;oftware Law Reform" Australian Communications October 1993,
57.
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takes place.124 This process of analytical dissection which appears in Altai, as well as in
other leading United States cases, was expressly rejected by our Court of Appeal in
Bleiman v News Media (Auckland) Ltd.
125
Bleiman involved a sports competition based on the results of sporting events. The
plaintiff was seeking an interim injunction to prevent a rival publication from starting a
similar game. The issue was whether the new competition substantially copied the features
126
of the existing one.
In addressing this issue the Court of Appeal laid out its approach to deciding whether
or not copyright had been breached. Approving the judgment of the House of Lords in
Ladbroke (Football) Ltd v William Hill (Football) Ltd,127 the Court of Appeal stated that the
first question to be considered was whether the "work as a whole" was original.128 The
129
court cited with approval a statement from Lord Reid that:
It may sometimes be a convenient shortcut to ask whether the part taken could by itself be
the subject of copyright. But in my view ... the more correct approach is first to determine
whether the plaintiff's work as a whole is original and protected by copyright and then to
inquire whether the part taken is substantial. A wrong result can easily be reached if one
begins by dissecting the plaintiffs work and asking, could section A be the subject of
copyright if it stood by itself.
The Court of Appeal then stated that in deciding whether a substantial part of the
work had been copied, the test, from Taypar Pty Ltd v Santic,130 was whether the essence of
the copyright work had been taken.131
In applying this approach to the facts the court rejected the defence's submission that
the features allegedly infringed were common to any game with similar subject matter. The
132
court stated that this was the dissectional approach rejected by Lord Reid in Ladbroke.
124 Above n 52.
125 Above n 7.
126 Above n 7,674-677.
127 [1964] 1 WLR 273.
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Having decided that copyright could reside in the plaintiff's ganr as a whole the court
concluded that it was arguable that the "whole essence of the garre had been taken and
retained" by the defendant. 133 The court granted an interim injunction in favour of the
plaintiff.
While the court in Bleiman was dealing only with an interlocutory injunction it clearly
lays out the approach which the Court of Appeal believed should be taken to the issue of
copyrightability and substantial similarity. In Bleiman the Court of Appeal took the view
that the first step is to look at the work as a whole to see whether it is original. This
approach is very similar to that taken Whelan and Paperback. Both those cases looked at
whether the program as a whole, rather than its individual elements, could be protected by
copyright.
The approached adopted in j3leiman is therefore very close to protecting the "look and
feel" of a work and, unless the courts wish to distinguish computers from other literary
works, then the "look and feel" approach would appear to be the approach that is likely to
be adopted.
Further support for this conclusion can be found in the decision in John Richardson, a
case dealt with in Ibcos. While accepting the general approach adopted in Altai, Ferris J
stated "that in preference to seeking the 'core of protectable expression' in the plaintiff's
program an English court will first decide whether the plaintiff's program as a whole is
entitled to copyright".134
The court in Ibcos accepted that statement to be a true account of the current approach
to the issue of copyrightability in England.
The process of analytical dissection which is inherent in the Altai test for
copyrightability and substantial similarity is clearly repugnant to New Zealand law. The
court in Bleiman has expressly rejected this approach and instead it has promoted the
protection of the "look and feel" of a copyrighted work. Just such an approach has been
applied in Ibcos to the non-litera 1 elements of a computer program. There the court found
that the work, as a whole, could be protected by copyright.135 Clearly, New Zealand law
is closer to the approach adopted in Whelan and Paperback, than it is to the approach in
Altai.
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C Conclusion
An examination of New Zealand law reveals that on the basis of established copyright
principles we should extend copyright protection to a program's non-literal elements
should be extended. The Copyright Act 1994 sets up a copyright scheme which is not
fundamentally different from that in other Commonwealth countries where protection has
been extended. The case law reveals a willingness by New Zealand courts to protect
copyrighted works from more than just literal copying. The courts are prepared to protect
some of the ideas. Moreover, the courts do not distinguish between functional and
aesthetic items when asking whether something can be protected by copyright.
In approaching the narrower issue of copyrightability in individual cases New
Zealand law appears closer to the early "look and feel" cases in the United States - such as
Whelan and Paperback - rather than the latter cases - such as Altai - where the tests involve
the analytical dissection of a work. This may put us at odds with the current approach in
the United States but with no guidelines from the legislature the courts must apply existing
copyright principles. In that regard it would appear that extensive protection would be
afforded to a program's non-literal elements.
V CONCLUSION
That a Mills and Boon novel is protected by copyright as a literary work requires a
leap of imagination. However, an even greater leap of imagination is required to think of
computer software as a "literary work". Nonetheless, this is the bizarre fiction which we
have to deal with under the Copyright Act 1994. What is more bizarre, however, is that
the New Zealand legislature, in imposing this fiction, has provided no guidance as to the
limits of copyright in the area of computer programs. The issue of limits has simply been
left to our courts.
This article has shown that, on the basis of New Zealand law, New Zealand should
provide extensive copyright protection to computer programs. However, while there rrlay
be no legal grounds to deny copyright protection to a program's non-literal elements, it
should be acknowledged that there are policy grounds for doing so. Although New
Zealand law does not draw any legal distinction between functional and aesthetic works
many commentators argue that on policy grounds you can distinguish computer programs
from other literary work.
What lies at the heart of policy concerns is the belief that computer programs are
fundamentally different from other functional items protected by copyright as computer
programs are not designed simply to convey information, but to cause processes to be
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performed.136 Therefore, there is the danger that extensive copyright protection for
computer programs will provide patent like protection when the program has not actually
had to meet the stringent requirements of patent law.137
Computer programs are also fundamentally different from other literary works in that
standardization and intero-perability are desirable. Literary works are valued for their
variety and their uniqueness. However, variety is not a desirable goal of the software
industry.138 The ability to interact and operate with other programs and the ability to rreet
industry standards is the goal of most computer products. Therefore there is the danger
that if strong copyright protection is provided programrs will be forced to make variations
that serve no useful purpose, locking them out of the market since consumers have become
familiar with the "standard product".139
It must also be acknowledged that copyright protection directly impacts on the level of
innovation within an industry.
140 ii
An economic analysis of copyright protection suggests
that as copyright protection increases beyond a certain level, the rate of innovation will
actually decline - notwithstanding the increased protection given to developers. „141
Therefore, there is the possibility that by providing extensive copyright protection the
courts may stunt innovation within New Zealand's developing software industry.
The consideration of these different policy issues has clearly influenced the decisions in
the United States. Altai. Brown Bag, Microsoft and Borland identify a number of these
concerns in limiting the protection available to computer programs.142 On the other hand,
the court in Paperback argued that concerns over the functional nature of computers, the
need for standardisation and the desire that programrs be free to borrow and improve
136
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142 Above n 1, 817. Ihe court stated "[t]hat the Lotus menu command hierarchy is a method of
operation becomes clearer when one considers program compatibility. Under Lotus's theory, if
a user uses several different programs, he or she must learn how to perform the same operation
in a different way... We find this absurd".
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upon others ideas were not sufficient to override an authors rights.143 In Whelan the court
stated that:
144
Although the economic implications of this rule are necessarily somewhat speculative, we
nevertheless believe that the rule would advance the basic purpose underlying the
'idea/expression' distinction, 'the preservation of the balance between competition and
protection reflected in patent and copyright laws'.
Clearly the courts are not capable of resolving these policy issues by themselves.
Different courts can reach different conclusions by placing emphasis on different policy
concerns. Nevertheless, the courts clearly recognise that serious policy issues are
involved.
There is therefore a need for the legislature to return to the question of copyright
protection, not simply in regards to computer programs, but in regards to the information
age and the challenges it throws up (computer programs being one of only many). How our
legislature meets those challenges may effect whether New Zealand has an innovative and
creative economy which leads the world or an economy which dwells in the doldrums.
However, until the New Zealand legislature does face that challenge software developers
in New Zealand can only role their dice and hope that the numbers will fall their way
should they need to test the degree of protection which the Copyright Act 1994 affords
thern
143 Above n 6,57-69.
144 Above n 5, 1237.
